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Detection and localization of double
compression in MP3 audio tracks
Tiziano Bianchi1, Alessia De Rosa2, Marco Fontani3, Giovanni Rocciolo4 and Alessandro Piva4*
Abstract
In this work, by exploiting the traces left by double compression in the statistics of quantized modified discrete cosine
transform coefficients, a single measure has been derived that allows to decide whether an MP3 file is singly or doubly
compressed and, in the last case, to devise also the bit-rate of the first compression. Moreover, the proposed method
as well as two state-of-the-art methods have been applied to analyze short temporal windows of the track, allowing
the localization of possible tampered portions in the MP3 file under analysis. Experiments confirm the good
performance of the proposed scheme and demonstrate that current detection methods are useful for tampering
localization, thus offering a new tool for the forensic analysis of MP3 audio tracks.
Keywords: Audio; Forensics; Double compression; Fake quality MP3; Tampering localization
1 Introduction
In the last years, the research in multimedia forensics
started to consider audio contents for investigating their
origin and authenticity. In particular, similarly to the
image forensic field, the analysis of the artifacts due to
double compression has received a lot of attention. Basing
on such digital footprints, in this paper, we will assume the
role of the forensic analyst that wants to discover two of
the main forgeries that a MP3 audio track can undergo: (i)
fake quality, i.e., the audio file is recompressed at higher
bit-rate to pass it off as a high-quality track and (ii) tam-
pering, i.e., a portion of the audio track has been edited
or deleted. In particular, our aim is to propose a forensic
scheme able to detect fake quality audio tracks and to pro-
vide information on the first compression bit-rate, as well
as to localize possible tampered portions in audio files.
The works dealing with MP3 audio files and double
audio compression proposed in the current literature are
briefly reported in the following. In [1], to defeat fake
quality MP3, authors observed that there are many more
quantized modified discrete cosine transform (MDCT)
coefficients with small values in a singly compressed MP3
file than in a fake quality MP3 file, no matter which bit-
rate the fake quality MP3 was transcoded from. According
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to this, a detector was proposed that just measures the
number of MDCT coefficients assuming ±1 values and
compares this value to a given threshold T : if it is lower
than T, the file is a fake quality one, otherwise it is a
singly compressed one. The same authors in [2] proposed
to detect double MP3 compression through the use of
support vector machine classifiers with feature vectors
formed by the distributions of the first digits of quan-
tized MDCT coefficients; in particular, a global method
was proposed, where the statistics on the first digits of
all quantized MDCT coefficients are taken, and the com-
puted probability distributions of nine digits are used as
features (nine dimensions) for training a support vector
machine (SVM). A so-called band distribution method
is also proposed, where a procedure of band division is
added before computing the statistics on the first dig-
its, allowing to increase the performance. In [3,4], to
detect double MP3 compression, some statistical features
of the MDCT are extracted and a SVM is applied to the
extracted features for classification. A set of statistical
features of zero MDCT coefficients and nonzero MDCT
coefficients from the frequency range as well as individ-
ual scale bands are adopted. In [5,6], a forgery detection
method for MP3 audio files is proposed. Based on the
observation that forgeries break the original frame seg-
mentation, frame offsets are used to locate forgeries auto-
matically, allowing to detect most common forgeries, such
© 2014 Bianchi et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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as deletion, insertion, substitution, and splicing. How-
ever, experimental results are carried out in audio files
that have not been reencoded in MP3 format after the
manipulation. In [7], a method is presented to determine
the encoder of MP3 data on the basis of statistical fea-
tures extracted from the data; the work also addresses
the classification of MP3 files recompressed with differ-
ent encoders but considering the same value of bit-rate
for the second compression. Finally, in [8], the inverse
decoder problem is considered. In this scenario, only
the uncompressed samples are known to the analyst and
the goal is to recover the parameters of a possible previous
compression. The same problem is tackled in [9], where
some properties of the frequency spectrum of the track
under analysis are exploited; the same classifier used to
differentiate between different MP3 quality levels is also
applied to detect transcoded MP3s, but for this scenario,
the presented experiments are rather limited.
In this work, which is an extension of a previous work
[10], we propose an approach exploiting the effect of dou-
ble compression in the statistical properties of quantized
MDCT coefficients in MP3 audio files. The method, that
will be presented in Section 2, relies on a single mea-
sure derived from the statistics of MDCT coefficients,
allowing us to apply a simple threshold detector to decide
whether a given MP3 file is singly compressed or it has
been doubly compressed, without resorting to SVM clas-
sifiers. Moreover, the proposed method is able to derive
the bit-rate of the first compression by means of a nearest
neighbour classifier. The ability of the algorithm to detect
doubly MP3 compressed files remains valid also on tracks
of reduced length, allowing its application to the localiza-
tion of singly/doubly compressed segments within a MP3
audio file, as shown in Section 3.
In Section 4, the performance of the proposed method
is evaluated and compared to two previously proposed
schemes, namely Yang et al. [2] and Liu et al. [3,4] in
the fake quality detection scenario. In order to do the
same comparison in the audio tampering scenario, in the
same section, we present also the application of the pro-
posed scheme and of the two state-of-the-art algorithms
to the forgery scenario we have considered: in particular,
we tested the accuracy of such doubly compressed audio
file detectors when the audio track length is reduced and
we exploited their use for tampering localization.
Finally, in Section 5, some conclusions about our
research are drawn.
2 Detection and classification of double
compression
The core idea of the algorithm is to measure the similarity
between the histogram of quantized MDCT coefficients
of theMP3 file under analysis, that has possibly undergone
a double compression, and the histogram of the MDCT
coefficients computed on a singly compressed version of
the same file, that is of the singly compressed MDCT
coefficients. Intuitively, if the distance between the two
distributions is low, this will indicate that the file under
analysis has not been MP3 encoded twice; vice versa, the
file will be considered as doubly compressed.
Obtaining a reliable estimate of the distribution of
the singly quantized MDCT coefficients from the cor-
responding quantized or doubly quantized coefficients
appears to be a difficult task. However, it has already been
observed in the image forensic literature [11,12] that the
DCT coefficients obtained by applying a slight shift to the
grid used for computing the block DCT usually do not
exhibit quantization artifacts. In a similar way, the distri-
bution of the singly compressed MDCT coefficients can
be approximated by generating a simulated singly com-
pressed file, starting from the file under analysis. This can
be achieved by decompressing the MP3 file, removing a
given number of pulse code modulation (PCM) samples
of the decompressed version, and then recompressing the
remaining samples to the same compression quality of the
file under analysis.
To demonstrate that the idea is effective, an uncom-
pressed audio track, 4 s long, has been MP3 compressed
at several bit-rates in the set [64, 96, 128, 192] kbit/s, and
then recompressed to 160 kbit/s, in such a way to obtain
four doubly compressed versions, three with increas-
ing bit-rate, and one with decreasing bit-rate. Then, the
uncompressed file is also singly compressed to 160 kbit/s.
To each of these MP3 files, the previous procedure has
been applied to obtain a simulated singly compressed file,
by removing the first ten PCM samples to the decom-
pressed file and recompressing the remaining samples to
160 kbit/s. Then, the histograms of MDCT coefficients
extracted from the input original files and from the cor-
responding simulated singly compressed files have been
compared.
In Figure 1, the histograms related to the MP3 file dou-
bly compressed at 64 kbit/s and then to 160 kbit/s (left)
and to the simulated MP3 file singly compressed at 160
kbit/s (right) are shown. It is evident that the first his-
togram exhibits the characteristic pattern of a distribution
of coefficients that have undergone a double compres-
sion, whereas in the second one, these artifacts have been
removed, and thus the difference between the two his-
tograms is significant. Similar results are obtained when
the first compression was done with higher bit-rates but
still lower than 160 kbit/s, even if the effect of the double
quantization becomes smaller.
On the contrary, if the same procedure is applied to a
singly compressed MP3 file, it will happen that the his-
tograms of the input file (left) and the corresponding
simulated one (right) are very similar, as it is shown in
Figure 2.
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Figure 1MDCT histograms for doubly compressed file with increasing bit-rate and simulated singly compressed file.
A similar situation shows up when a double compres-
sion has been applied, but with the first bit-rate (i.e.,
192 kbit/s) equal or higher than the second one (i.e., 160
kbit/s), see Figure 3: in this case, the histogram of theMP3
file under analysis (left) does not exhibit the double com-
pression artifacts, so that the histograms of the two files
are very similar, thus not allowing to detect the double
compression. The removal of these artifacts is due to the
fact that the second compression is so strong that deletes
the traces left by the previous one.
According to the previous analysis, an algorithm com-
posed by the processing blocks illustrated in Figure 4 has
been derived: theMP3 file to be analyzed is decompressed
obtaining a sequence of PCM samples. Next, the Trim-
ming removes a given number of PCM samples starting
from the beginning of the PCM sequence in such a way
that the trimmed sequence is no more aligned with the
MP3 frame borders. The Filterbank + MDCT block takes
the PCM samples and applies filtering and the MDCT
transform, achieving a set of unquantized MDCT coef-
ficients. The steps of trimming and recompression allow
to remove possible double quantization artifacts, while
maintaining the original characteristics of the signal. The
Parameter extraction allows to extract from the origi-
nal MP3 bitstream the quantization parameters, i.e., the
quantization pattern and the original quantization val-
ues. This information is needed by the Re-quantizer to
simulate a distribution of MDCT coefficients that have
undergone only a single compression. In addition, the
Re-quantizer smooths the sequence of simulated coeffi-
cients through a Laplace Smoothing [13], a technique used
to smooth categorical data (in particular, the smooth-
ing parameter α equal to 1 was adopted). This operation
aims at filling possible empty bins present in the data
histogram and thus avoiding numerical errors in the fol-
lowing computations. The original quantized values and
the simulated singly quantized values are then compared
through the Histograms distances block.
Indicating with X and Y respectively the observed and
the simulated distributions of MDCT coefficients, their
histograms are built, and a similarity measure is com-
puted. Among the possible measures that can be used
−200 0 200
0
500
1000
1500
Original
−200 0 200
0
500
1000
1500
Simulation
Figure 2MDCT histograms for singly compressed file and simulated singly compressed file.
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Figure 3MDCT histograms for doubly compressed file with decreasing bit-rate and simulated singly compressed file.
to compute the distance between two histograms, we
adopted the chi-square distanceDχ (X,Y ) [14], defined as:
Dχ (X,Y ) =
N∑
i=1
(Xi − Yi)2
2 (Xi + Yi) (1)
where N is the number of bins of the histograms.
The computed distance measure represents the feature
the proposed method uses to detect whether a MP3 file
has been singly or doubly compressed.
The proposed feature (as it will be shown in Section 4)
is able to provide additional information about the com-
pression suffered by the analyzed MP3 file, in particular
concerning the difference between the second and the
first bit-rate ( = BR2 − BR1): when such a value is
positive the proposed algorithm is able to classify dou-
bly compressed MP3 audio tracks with respect to the first
compression bit-rate. In fact, the values assumed by the
feature range quite differently according to the second bit-
rate and the factor, thus allowing to cluster doubly com-
pressedMP3 audio tracks by applying a nearest neighbour
classifier.
3 Application to tampering localization
Knowledge about double encoding of an MP3 track can
also provide evidence of local tampering. Let us assume
that a part of an MP3 track has been edited in such a
way as to alter the original audio recording. It is reason-
able to assume that the editing operation will also remove
the features due to MP3 compression. If such a track
is recompressed in MP3 format, then the original part
will exhibit the typical artifacts of double compression,
whereas the edited part will be very similar to a singly
compressed track. A similar behavior can be expected
also when a portion of an audio track is deleted: with
a very high probability, such a deletion will introduce a
desynchronization of the audio frames; hence, in case of
Figure 4 Scheme of the proposedmethod.
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recompression, the audio frames up to the deletion point
will be doubly compressed, whereas the audio frames
after the deletion point will appear as singly compressed
ones.
In order to use the proposed feature for tampering
localization, a natural strategy is to divide the analyzed
audio track into several short segments and to compute
a different value of the feature for each segment. In the
presence of a genuine audio track, the feature is expected
to have similar values on all audio segments. Conversely,
in the presence of tampering, the segments correspond-
ing to the manipulated part will have different values of
the feature with respect to the original part. In particular,
according to the above tampering model, we will assume
that a tampered part is characterized by a lower value of
the feature, corresponding to singly compressed audio
tracks. An example of this behavior is visible in Figure 5,
where we show the values of the proposed feature, ana-
lyzed by using audio segments 1/8 s long, for a genuine
audio track, where all segments are singly compressed
(top), and an audio track where the central part has been
edited and recompressed (bottom). Since the editing
operation removes the features due to compression, then
the original segments exhibit the artifacts of double com-
pression, whereas the edited ones are similar to a singly
compressed track.
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Figure 5 Feature values over temporal windows for a genuine file and a tampered file.
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In the following, we propose a simple automatic pro-
cedure to localize the manipulated parts in possibly
tampered MP3 tracks. The first step is to divide the to be
analyzed track into several audio segments and to com-
pute the value of the feature for each segment. The set of
values obtained in such a way are then clustered using the
expectation maximization (EM) algorithm [15]. Namely,
we will assume that the distribution of the proposed fea-
ture can be modelled as a mixture of two approximately
Gaussian components, corresponding to the original
part and the tampered part. The EM algorithm will pro-
duce two clusters of feature values characterized by the
respective cluster centers, D1 and D2, corresponding to
the mean value of the Gaussian component representing
each cluster.
Let us assume, without loss of generality, that the cluster
centers satisfy D2 > D1. According to the previous analy-
sis, a given audio track will be classified as tampered if the
EM algorithm finds two nonempty clusters. Furthermore,
when a track is classified as tampered, the audio segments
belonging to the cluster with the lower mean, i.e., D1, will
reveal the position of the tampered part.
The rationale of the proposed approach is evident by
looking at Figure 6, showing the distributions of the
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Figure 6 Histogram of feature values on a genuine file and a tampered file.
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Figure 7 Chi-square distances computed for the 30,000 audio segments composing the dataset.
feature values for an original (top) audio track and a tam-
pered audio track (bottom), where the different colors
highlight the two Gaussian components found by the EM
algorithm. In the case of a genuine MP3 track, all the val-
ues of the feature will be similar, so that the EM algorithm
will usually find a single cluster. Conversely, in the case of
a tampered MP3 track, the values of the feature form two
distinct clusters, corresponding to the original part and
the manipulated part, which are well separated by the EM
algorithm.
4 Experimental results
To validate the ideas proposed in the previous section,
an audio dataset has been built, trying to represent as
much as possible heterogeneous sources. To this aim,
the database includes uncompressed audio files belonging
to four different categories: Music, royalty free music
audio tracks, with five different musical styles [16]; Speech,
music audio files containing dialogues; Outdoor, audio
files relative to recording outdoors; and Commercial, files
containing dialogues combined with music, as often hap-
pens in advertising. Each category collects about 17min of
audio. Throughout all the experiments, we employed the
latest release of the lame codec (available at http://lame.
sourceforge.net), namely version 3.99.5. This choice was
motivated by the widespread adoption of this codec and
by the fact that it is an open source project.
4.1 Double compression detection and first compression
bit-rate classification
In order to evaluate the performance of our method in
detecting double compression, we divided each audio file
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Figure 8 ROC curve. ROC curve obtained by varying the threshold τ of the classifier (left). Separation of cases with positive  and negative or zero
 (right).
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Figure 9 Chi-square distances computed for doubly compressed files with positive.
into 250 segments 4 s long, for a total of 1,000 uncom-
pressed audio files. Each file has been compressed, in
dual mono, with bit-rate BR1 chosen in [64, 96, 128, 160,
192] kbit/s, obtaining 5,000 singly compressed MP3 files.
Finally, these files have been compressed again using as
BR2 one of the previous bit-rate values (also the same
value as the first one was considered) achieving 25,000
MP3 doubly compressed files. Among these, 10,000 files
have a difference  = BR2-BR1 between the second
and the first bit-rate which is positive, taking value in
[32, 64, 96, 128] kbit/s; 10,000 files have a negative differ-
ence  taking value in [−128, −96, −64, −32] kbit/s and
5,000 files have  = 0. The overall dataset is thus
composed by 30,000 MP3 files, including 5,000 singly
compressed files.
As a first experiment, we computed the values assumed
by the proposed feature for all the 30,000 files belonging to
the test dataset. The chi-square distance has been calcu-
lated by evaluating the MDCT histograms on 2,000 bins,
with step size equal to one. In Figure 7, the chi-square dis-
tances are visualized: singly compressed files and doubly
Table 1 Detection accuracy of the proposedmethod for
different bit-rates
BR1 vs BR2 64 96 128 160 192
64 - 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
96 49.9 - 99.9 99.9 99.9
128 49.9 49.9 - 99.9 99.9
160 69.5 47.9 49.1 - 96.7
192 56.1 66.4 57.8 67.4 -
compressed files with negative or zero  show a distance
D near to zero, whereas the other files have D rather
higher than zero. By comparing D with a threshold τ , it
is possible to discriminate these two kinds of files: doubly
compressed files with  > 0 and the other ones.
By adopting a variable threshold τ , we then computed
a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, repre-
senting the capacity of the detector to separate singly
compressed from doubly compressed MP3 files (includ-
ing  > or ≤ 0). The trend of the obtained ROC curve
is shown in Figure 8 (left): it reflects the bimodal distri-
bution of distances of doubly compressed files (blue and
green colored in Figure 7) and highlights that the detector
is able to distinguish only one of the two components (the
one with  > 0). If we separate the previous ROC in one
relating to files doubly compressed with positive  and
one to files doubly compressed with negative or zero , as
is shown in Figure 8 (right), when doubly compressed files
with positive  are considered, we obtain an almost per-
fect classifier, while when the cases with negative or zero
 are analyzed, we are next to the random classifier.
Table 2 Detection accuracy of LSQmethod for different
bit-rates
BR1 vs BR2 64 96 128 160 192
64 - 100.0 99.9 99.9 100.0
96 97.7 - 99.5 99.7 100.0
128 96.3 98.4 - 98.1 100.0
160 88.8 98.4 98.4 - 99.9
192 72.9 96.0 95.9 94.7 -
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Table 3 Detection accuracy of YSHmethod for different
bit-rates
BR1 vs BR2 64 96 128 160 192
64 - 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.3
96 96.2 - 99.7 99.7 98.8
128 80.2 99.0 - 99.2 98.1
160 84.5 94.1 96.3 - 98.0
192 67.6 88.5 89.9 90.3 -
As anticipated in Section 2, the distance representing
the proposed feature assumes a large range of values, as
it can be clearly observed in Figure 7. In order to high-
light the relationship between the values taken by the
feature and the compression parameters (i.e., BR2 and
), we examined in more detail the 10,000 doubly com-
pressed files with positive , plotting their chi-square
distances in Figure 9. Such values were plotted according
to the different : in particular, there are 4,000 files with
 = 32 (yellow), 3,000 files with  = 64 (violet), 2,000
files with  = 96 (sky-blue), and finally 1,000 files with
 = 128 (black) and grouped for different BR2: [96, 128,
160, 192]. Figure 9 shows that the values of chi-square
distance tend to cluster for different  factors and differ-
ent BR2 values (see plotting with same color). On the one
hand, the increasing  values correspond to increasing
Chi-square distances between the observed and simulated
distribution. On the other hand, given a value of , for
different bit-rate of the second compression, slightly dif-
ferent values of distance are obtained. This suggests the
possibility of optimizing the detector by considering a spe-
cific threshold for each bit-rate of the second compression
(a parameter observable from the bitstream). Moreover,
the different values of the feature for different  factors
can be used to classify the bit-rate of the first compression,
as detailed in the following sections.
As to detection, we performed a set of experiments in
order to compare the detection accuracy of the proposed
scheme with respect to the detection accuracy of the
methods proposed in [3,4] by Liu et al. (LSQ method) and
in [2] by Yang et al. (YSH method). Corresponding results
are shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The classi-
fiers have been trained on 80% of the dataset and tested
on the remaining 20%. Results have been averaged over
20 independent trials. In our method, different thresh-
olds have been employed for different BR2 values, while
for the other methods, different SVMs have been trained
for different BR2 values. The proposed method achieves
nearly optimal performances for all combinations with
 > 0. Also, the other methods generally achieve good
performances for  > 0, especially the LSQ method.
Conversely, for  < 0, the proposed method is not able
to reliably detect double MP3 compression, whereas the
other methods have better performances.
All the results shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 have been
achieved considering audio tracks 4 s long. We evaluated
the degradation of the performance of the three detec-
tors when the duration of the audio segments is reduced
from 4 s to [2, 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16] s. The reason
behind this experiment is that analyzing very small por-
tions of audio potentially opens the door to fine-resolution
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Figure 10 Detection accuracy with varying audio file duration for BR2= 192 kbit/s and BR2= 128 kbit/s.
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Table 4 Classification accuracy of the proposedmethod
for BR2= 192
Actual vs pred. Singly 192 160 128 96 64
Singly 81.7 18.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
192 23.0 77.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
160 0.0 0.6 99.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
128 0.0 0.0 7.9 81.7 10.4 0.0
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 77.6 11.3
64 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 24.1 74.9
splicing localization (i.e., detect if part of an audio file
has been tampered). Practically, instead of taking all the
MDCT coefficients of the 4-s long segment, only the coef-
ficients belonging to a subpart of the segment are retained,
where the subpart is just one half, one fourth, and so on.
For BR2 = 192 kbit/s and BR2 = 128 kbit/s, the detection
accuracies (averaged with respect to BR1) have been plot-
ted with varying audio file duration in Figure 10 for our
method, the LSQ method, and the YSH method.
The proposed method and LSQ achieve a nearly con-
stant detection performance up to 1/8-s audio segments,
whereas the performance of the YSH method drops for
audio segments under 2 s. Our method achieves very
good performance in the case of high-quality MP3 files:
indeed, for BR2 equal to 192 kbit/s, our method achieves
an almost perfect classification performance irrespec-
tive of the audio segment duration. Conversely, For BR2
equal to 128 kbit/s, even if the performance is only
slightly affected by the segment duration, the proposed
method remains inferior with respect to the other two
methods.
By taking into account the feature distribution high-
lighted in Figure 9, we then considered the capability of
the proposed feature to classify the doubly compressed
file according to the first compression bit-rate, as BR1 =
BR2-. A nearest neighbour classifier has been adopted
for each different BR2 and the corresponding classifica-
tion accuracy results are shown in Table 4 for BR2 = 192
kbit/s and Table 5 for BR2 = 128 kbit/s. The rows of the
tables represent the actual bit-rate of the first compression
Table 5 Classification accuracy of the proposedmethod
for BR2= 128
Actual vs pred. Singly 192 160 128 96 64
Singly 34.0 36.9 24.6 4.5 0.0 0.0
192 29.6 44.1 19.6 6.7 0.0 0.0
160 12.0 1.8 86.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
128 0.3 15.7 0.2 83.8 0.0 0.0
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 96.6 0.4
64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 7.6 91.7
Table 6 Classification accuracy of LSQmethod for
BR2= 192
Actual vs pred. Singly 192 160 128 96 64
Singly 88.0 12.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
192 12.8 87.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
160 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
128 0.0 0.0 0.1 99.9 0.0 0.0
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0
64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 99.6
and the columns the values assigned by the classifier. A
comment about this experiment is in order: as shown in
the previous section, the proposed method will hardly
detect double compression for negative or zero . Simi-
larly, the output of the classifier on doubly encoded files
with negative or zero  is not reliable. In particular, since
a singly compressed file can be considered like having
undergone a (virtual) first compression at infinite quality,
the classifier cannot distinguish between singly encoded
files and doubly encoded files with negative .
For comparison, only the LSQ method is considered
since the YSH method was not proposed for compression
classification. The corresponding results obtained on 4-s
audio segments for BR2 = 192, 128 kbit/s are shown in
Tables 6 and 7, respectively.
As in the case of detection, we experimented how the
classification performances vary with respect to audio file
duration. The average classification accuracy for differ-
ent BR2 (i.e., [192, 160, 128, 96, 64] kbit/s) and decreased
audio file duration (i.e., [4, 2, 1, 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16] s) are
shown in Figure 11 for both our method (top) and LSQ
method (bottom). The accuracy is averaged over every
possible BR1 in the dataset, thus providing a fair over-
all index of classification accuracy, that can be used to
compare different methods and show a clear performance
trend for different audio segment lengths.
In this scenario, LSQ appears to have a better classifica-
tion performance, even if the proposed method performs
reasonably well for the higher bit-rates. It is also worth
noting that the performances of both methods suffer only
Table 7 Classification accuracy of LSQmethod for
BR2= 128
Actual vs pred. Singly 192 160 128 96 64
Singly 89.0 5.7 0.8 4.5 0.0 0.0
192 6.1 81.5 10.6 1.8 0.0 0.0
160 1.1 11.0 87.6 0.2 0.0 0.0
128 4.7 2.0 0.1 93.3 0.0 0.0
96 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 99.9 0.1
64 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0
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Figure 11 Accuracy of the proposed and LSQ classifiers with varying audio file duration.
a slight degradation for the shorter audio segments, which
suggests good localization capabilities.
4.2 Tampering localization
As explained in Section 3, the proposed method for dou-
ble compression analysis can be used as a tool for audio
forgery localization. Although this possibility was not con-
sidered in the respective papers, previous experiments
seem to prove that also the methods YSH and LSQ can
be used for such a task, by analyzing the track using small
windows. We thus designed a set of experiments to test
the applicability of each of the considered algorithms to
forgery localization: we divided the uncompressed files
mentioned at the beginning of this section in segments
of 10 s each, obtaining 100 files. Among these, 60 were
chosen at random to build a training set, while the rest
were used as the test set. Since the goal is to localize tam-
pered segments within a file, test files were created as
follows:
1. The file was MP3 compressed at a bit-rate BR1 ∈ {96,
128, 160} kbit/s.
2. The file was decoded and a portion of 1 s, located at
the center of the track, was replaced with the
same-positioned samples coming from the
uncompressed file.
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3. The resulting track was re-compressed at a bit-rate
BR1 + , with  taking values in {−32, 0, 32} kbit/s.
In such a way, we created a cut-and-paste tampering
that is virtually undetectable by a human listener (the
pasted content is the same, just without the first com-
pression); this also avoids facilitating the detector by
introducing abrupt changes in audio content.
The above procedure creates files where 1/10 of the
track is tampered, and the rest is untouched. While this
scenario is reasonable for testing localization capabilities,
it does not fit well to training a classifier (needed formeth-
ods YSH and LSQ), where a more balanced distribution
of positive and negative examples is preferable. Keeping in
mind that each file will be analyzed using small windows,
and that each window will be classified as singly or doubly
encoded, we generated the training dataset as follows:
1. The file was MP3 compressed at a bit-rate BR1 ∈ {96,
128, 160} kbit/s.
2. The file was decoded and the part of the track
between second 5 and 6 was cut and appended at the
end of the file.
3. The resulting track was re-compressed at a bit-rate
BR1 + , with  taking values in {-32, 0, 32} kbit/s.
In such a way, samples in the first half of the track will
show traces of double encoding, while samples in the sec-
ond half will not, due to the induced misalignment of the
quantization pattern.
Similarly to what we did in previous experiments, it
is of interest to evaluate the localization performance of
each algorithm for different sizes of the analysis window:
a smaller size causes noisier measurements but higher
temporal resolution, allowing the analyst to detect subtle
modifications, like turning into a voice recording a word
‘yes’ into a ‘no’. The set {1/4, 1/8, 1/16} s was then cho-
sen as possible values for the size of the window. When
analyzing a file, the analyst knows both the size of the
window he wants to employ and the bit-rate of the last
compression undergone by the file. In light of this, the
training procedure for algorithms LSQ and YSH can be
done separately, creating a SVM for each BR2 (in our
case, BR2 ∈ {64, 96, 128, 160, 192}) and for each size of
the analysis window. We chose RBF kernels and used
fivefold cross validation to determine the best values for
C ∈ {23, 24, . . . 212} and γ ∈ {2−4, 2−3, . . . , 25}. Concern-
ing the proposed algorithm, we used the training samples
to get a good initialization point for the expectation-
maximization algorithm: specifically, we computed the
average value of the χ2 distance obtained for singly
compressed sequences and doubly compressed sequences
available in the training set, resulting in μ1 = 0.004
and μ2 = 0.015, respectively. The algorithm stops when
either the log likelihood stabilizes (difference between
two iterations lower than 10−15) or a maximum of 500
iterations is reached.
Performance of YSH and LSQ algorithms were eval-
uated as follows: given a test file, the proper SVM was
selected based on the observed bit-rate and the chosen
window size; then the file was decoded and coefficients
were classified, moving the analysis window. After repeat-
ing the same approach for all the files, we computed the
probability of correctly classifying a window as tampered,
denoted by Pr(T) and the probability of correctly classify-
ing a window as original, denoted by Pr(O). Since by using
probabilities we are normalizing the different size of each
class, the final accuracy can be simply calculated as
ACC = Pr(O) + Pr(T)2 .
A similar approach was used to evaluate performance
of the proposed algorithm. After executing the EM algo-
rithm, if a mixture of two Gaussians was found, we
labelled as tampered those windows belonging to the
model with lower mean; if only one Gaussian component
was found, all the windows were classified as untouched.
Finally, the localization accuracy of the algorithm was
computed with the same formula described above.
Results are reported in Table 8, for different sizes of
the analysis window. Results are separated according to
the difference between the first and second compression
bit-rate (main rows), while the final value of BR2 is given
in the columns (this is the only information available to
the analyst). Since possible values for BR1 were limited
to be in {96, 128, 160}, some combinations of BR2 and
Table 8 Tampering localization accuracy obtained by each
algorithm for different window sizes
 = +32  = 0  = −32
BR2 OUR YSH LSQ OUR YSH LSQ OUR YSH LSQ
1/16 s 64 - - - - - - 50.0 64.8 60.5
96 - - - 49.0 76.3 57.4 50.0 71.7 56.9
128 93.3 92.3 77.3 49.3 82.2 53.6 50.0 80.5 65.0
160 90.7 92.8 73.9 50.1 84.7 51.0 - - -
192 89.8 93.3 93.1 - - - - - -
1/8 s 64 - - - - - - 50.0 67.5 58.0
96 - - - 50.0 78.4 60.2 50.0 73.5 57.5
128 89.2 91.7 76.1 50.1 83.1 58.7 50.0 82.4 64.4
160 88.1 91.5 68.7 49.9 86.4 53.3 - - -
192 89.2 90.9 91.9 - - - - - -
1/4 s 64 - - - - - - 50.0 73.0 56.9
96 - - - 50.0 82.6 61.8 50.0 75.5 56.3
128 91.2 92.6 79.9 50.0 86.8 63.1 50.0 84.2 67.8
160 92.0 95.2 74.2 50.0 89.6 60.3 - - -
192 92.0 92.2 93.4 - - - - - -
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 are not explored. As we can see, the proposed algo-
rithm yields comparable performance to the method YSH
and outperforms LSQ when BR2 is higher than BR1. For
zero or negative s, coherently with previous results, the
proposedmodel is not able to discriminate forged regions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, a method to localize the presence of dou-
ble compression artifacts in a MP3 audio file has been
presented, with the aim of uncovering possibly tampered
parts. We proposed an algorithm based on a simple statis-
tical feature measuring the effect of double compression
that allows to decide whether a MP3 file is singly com-
pressed or it has been doubly compressed and also to
derive the bit-rate of the first compression. In addition, the
proposed scheme as well as two state-of-the-art methods
designed for detecting doubly compressed MP3 files have
been applied to analyze short temporal windows, in such
a way to allow the localization of tampered portions in the
MP3 file under analysis.
The proposed algorithm is very effective when the bit-
rate of the second compression is higher than the bit-rate
of the first one but offers limited performance in the
opposite case, where it is outperformed by state-of-the-
art methods, based on SVM classifiers. On the other hand,
we must keep in mind that the proposed approach does
not exploit machine learning techniques, as the previous
schemes did, so that its performance is less affected than
other methods by the choice of a suitable training set.
In our opinion, the main contribution of the paper
regards the tampering localization scenario. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first time that techniques
used for detecting double compression in MP3 audio files
are used in this kind of scenario. We also point out that
the authors in [3,4] and [2] did not investigate how their
methods would perform on very short audio segments.
The results provide some interesting insights. For exam-
ple, we see thatmore complex features, which achieve very
good results in the simple detection scenario, may not be
well suited for the localization scenario. This is evident in
the performance of LSQ features for localization, which is
sensibly lower than the performance achieved in the sim-
ple detection scenario. We believe that this is due to the
difficulty of providing a good training set for the localiza-
tion scenario, which negatively affects methods based on
machine learning. Moreover, we also see that in the high-
quality scenario, a simple feature based on calibrationmay
obtain a performance very close to that of state-of-the-art
features, without requiring a SVM.
There are some interesting issues that can be consid-
ered for further research. For example, the detection and
localization accuracies of the different algorithms may be
affected by the actual codec(s) used in the first and sec-
ond compressions. Since the proposed feature is based
on a simple histogram distance, we believe that differ-
ent encoder/decoders should not affect much the per-
formance. Nevertheless, more complex features may be
affected by the encoder, especially if the detector is trained
on a different encoder that the one actually used. Another
aspect is the use of a variable bit-rate (VBR) encoding
strategy: since the proposed approach does not consider
the MDCT coefficients according to the different quanti-
zation factors, but compute global histograms, we think
that the different quantization factors induced by VBRwill
not affect significantly the proposed approach. However,
we leave analysis of VBR to future work.
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